Africa is seeking a greater role in the global space economy following the official inauguration of the African Space Agency (AfSA) April 20. The ceremony marked the culmination of a decade-long effort to unify programs across 55 countries.

Headquartered in Egypt, the first African country to operate its own satellite in 1998, AfSA aims to coordinate and empower continental space activities through collaboration and shared resources.

As one of its initial actions, AfSA signed far-reaching cooperation agreements with ESA, the UAE Space Agency and Russia’s #Roscosmos.

Addressing African challenges

Over the past three decades, 18 African nations have collectively deployed more than 60 satellites. Yet, Africa’s space sector remains relatively small on the global stage and heavily dependent on foreign support.

African nations collectively allocated just $426 million for space activities in 2025, including contributions to AfSA, according to boutique consulting firm Space in Africa.

In contrast, ESA has an $8.7 billion budget for 2025, in addition to sizable space-related contributions from the European Union, while NASA’s fiscal year 2025 allocation alone reached $25.4 billion.

According to Space in Africa’s figures, the amount African nations allocated for 2025 is also down 7.73% year-on-year following economic pressures, shifting national priorities and some projects moving from construction to an operational phase.

Depreciation of national currencies against the U.S. dollar contributed to the headline decline. Space in Africa senior analyst Mustapha Iderawumi said some countries maintained or slightly increased their space budgets in local currencies.

Nigeria, for example, increased its local currency budget by 47.5% to 94.30 billion Nigerian Naira ($60 million), yet currency depreciation significantly reduced its dollar equivalent compared with previous years.
Managing foreign influence

Although annual space agency budgets across Africa remain modest, countries are increasingly leveraging financing from outside the continent to develop sovereign satellite capabilities.

Angola’s yearly space budget has consistently been under $5 million, Iderawumi noted, but in January its government took out a 225 million euro ($255 million) loan from a French investment bank to fund ANGEO-1, its inaugural Earth observation satellite.

And while European aerospace giant Airbus is building ANGEO-1, a new breed of manufacturer is gaining traction with smaller, cost-effective satellites in geostationary and low Earth orbit to help countries join the space community.

Last year, European microsatellite specialist EnduroSat announced plans to build Botswana’s inaugural satellite — Botsat-1, an Earth observation spacecraft based on a three-unit (3U) standard cubesat structure — in collaboration with a local university.

Botsat-1 is also part of a broader goal to build out a space hub in the country, where engineers from Botswana International University of Science and Technology would ultimately operate the satellite using software from EnduroSat.
Equitable space access

Facing the rapid expansion of Starlink and other major megaconstellations, AfSA arrives amid rising global pressure to ensure equitable access to limited orbital slots and radio frequencies.

South Africa, boasting the largest space budget on the continent, recently revised regulations to facilitate the entry of Starlink and other foreign communications providers, following a high-level diplomatic visit to the United States in May. The high cost of satellite equipment and subscriptions remains a substantial barrier to widespread adoption.

At the World Radiocommunication Conference in 2023, industry executives highlighted growing concerns from developing nations about being locked out from increasingly congested orbital environments.

One outcome of WRC-23 was a decision to formally study equitable procedures for allocating access to critical Q and V spectrum bands.

AfSA is also pursuing initiatives to enhance transparency, competitive bidding and equitable participation for space contractors in Africa.

But perhaps most importantly, advanced satellite technologies are broadly recognized as essential tools for strengthening the agricultural markets that serve as a cornerstone for many African economies.

According to the United Nations, about a fifth of Africa’s population faces food insecurity, with regional disparities prevalent across the continent.

Space also offers solutions for the continent’s considerable digital divide. With nearly two-thirds of Africans lacking broadband access, satellite services can efficiently reach underserved areas where geography and prohibitive ground telecoms infrastructure costs pose significant challenges.

AfSA’s success may be measured by how much it changes there.

This article first appeared in the June 2025 issue of SpaceNews Magazine with the title “Africa’s united space front.”

WASHINGTON — A year after the launch of a flawed crewed test flight of Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner, NASA has yet to determine the next mission for the spacecraft with mixed signals about the vehicle’s future.

In a statement June 6, NASA said it was still studying options for the next flight of Starliner, expected no earlier than early 2026. That includes whether that next flight will be crewed or uncrewed.

“NASA is assessing the earliest potential for a Starliner flight to the International Space Station in early 2026, pending system certification and resolution of Starliner’s technical issues,” the agency stated. “The agency is still evaluating whether Starliner’s next flight will be in a crew or cargo configuration.”

The comments came a year to the day after Starliner docked with the ISS on the Crew Flight Test (CFT) mission. That docking took place despite the failure of several thrusters that, for a time, put the ability of Starliner to safely dock in question. The problems with the thrusters, along with helium leaks detected in flight, led NASA to decide in August 2024 to return Starliner uncrewed, requiring NASA astronauts Suni Williams and Butch Wilmore to remain on the station until coming back on a Crew Dragon in March.

Second ispace lunar lander presumed lost.

Resilience, the second mission by Japanese company ispace, likely crashed attempting a landing on the moon June 5.

Resilience was scheduled to land at 3:17 p.m. Eastern at Mare Frigoris, a region at about 60 degrees north latitude on the near side of the moon. Once on the surface, the lander was designed to operate for a lunar day, or about two weeks, until sunset causes the solar-powered lander to shut down.

While ispace said the initial phases of the landing attempt went as planned, telemetry displayed on the company’s webcast indicated that the lander reached the surface about one minute and 45 seconds before the scheduled landing time, with a reported speed of 187 kilometers per hour, far too fast for a safe landing. Telemetry was then lost, or no longer displayed, and the company ended the webcast about 25 minutes later with no updates on the lander’s status.

In a statement issued about five hours after the scheduled landing, the company acknowledged that Resilience was likely lost. “The laser rangefinder used to measure the distance to the lunar surface experienced delays in obtaining valid measurement values. As a result, the lander was unable to decelerate sufficiently to reach the required speed for the planned lunar landing,” ispace stated.

“Based on these circumstances, it is currently assumed that the lander likely performed a hard landing on the lunar surface,” the company concluded. It added there had been no contact with the lander after the scheduled landing time.

“Given that there is currently no prospect of a successful lunar landing, our top priority is to swiftly analyze the telemetry data we have obtained thus far and work diligently to identify the cause,” Takeshi Hakamada, founder and chief executive of ispace, said in the statement.

The company released the statement at the same time as Hakamada and other ispace executives held a press conference on Tokyo. They provided few additional technical details about the failed landing, stating that they needed to do more analysis to identify the root cause. They declined to speculate on those potential root causes.

They added, though, that the problem appeared to be different from the company’s first lander, similar in design to Resilience, which crashed in an April 2023 landing. The company attributed that failure to a software problem that caused the spacecraft to believe it was on the surface when it was still at an altitude of five kilometers.

“There are different phenomena that we are observing, so we have to look at the root cause in more detail,” said Ryo Ujiie, chief technology officer of ispace, at the briefing. He noted later in the briefing that the laser rangefinder on Resilience was of a different design than the one on Mission 1 because the vendor had discontinued the earlier model.
Mission overview

Resilience launched on a Falcon 9 Jan. 15, sharing the launch with Firefly Aerospace’s Blue Ghost 1 lunar lander. While Firefly’s lander made a successful landing on the moon March 2, Resilience followed a low-energy trajectory to reduce propellant requirements, making a lunar flyby Feb. 14 that sent it on a trajectory that took it 1.1 million kilometers from the moon before returning.

Resilience entered orbit around the moon May 6, performing a series of maneuvers in subsequent weeks to place it in a final circular orbit at an altitude of 100 kilometers from which it would make its descent to the lunar surface.

The lander, with a dry mass of 340 kilograms, carried several payloads, such as a water electrolyzer, a food production experiment from Japanese companies and a deep space radiation probe from National Central University in Taiwan. It also included a “commemorative alloy plate” from a branch of Japanese entertainment company Bandai Namco and a memory disk from UNESCO.

The biggest payload was Tenacious, a five-kilogram rover developed by ispace’s European subsidiary. The rover was equipped with cameras and a scoop, which would be used to collect regolith. The company would then transfer ownership of that regolith to NASA under a $5,000 contract awarded in 2020, part of an effort by the agency to establish precedence for rights to space resources.

Tenacious also carried a small model house called The Moonhouse, created by a team led by Swedish artist Mikael Genberg. It is an art project that Genberg, at a briefing June 4, said will help create a new perspective on “what it is to be human, what life is all about.” Tenacious would have deployed The Moonhouse onto the lunar surface and take images of it.
Future missions

More lunar missions are on tap for ispace. The company’s U.S. subsidiary is building a new model of lander, called Apex 1.0, for a NASA Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) mission led by Draper and scheduled for launch in 2027, called Mission 3 by ispace. In Japan, ispace is working on a separate new lander design, called Series 3, for its Mission 4 in 2027 that is supported by an $80 million award from the Japanese government.

Because the landers are a different design from Resilience, ispace executives said it was unclear what impact the crash would have on them. However, they remained committed to flying them.

There are few companies capable of developing lunar landers, noted Jumpei Nozaki, chief financial officer of ispace, at the briefing, but many customers who want to fly their payloads on them, giving ispace a “competitive edge” if can demonstrate a successful landing.

“If we can succeed in these missions,” he said of Mission 3 and 4, “then we can show our ability to our customers.”

“It’s hard to land on the moon, technically,” Hakamada said. “We know it’s not easy. It’s not something that everyone can do.”

He noted, though, the successful lunar landings by American companies as well as the Japanese space agency JAXA. “We know it’s hard, but an important point is that it’s not impossible.”

Those other successes, he suggested, would serve as motivation for ispace to find and correct the problems that led to the failed Resilience landing. “The most important thing is to find out the cause for the second failure,” he said. “We have to use that to make Mission 3 and Mission 4 a success.”

The new attack surface: from space to smartphone . Imagine having seamless mobile broadband access anywhere on Earth, from the most remote deserts and oceans to disaster zones, all without the need for cell towers. That’s the promise of direct-to-cell (D2C) satellite communication, a breakthrough technology that allows ordinary, unmodified, smartphones to connect directly with satellites in low Earth orbit. Pioneered by companies like AST SpaceMobile, Lynk Global and SpaceX’s Starlink, this tech is set to change global connectivity. But as the barriers to connectivity fall, a flood of cyber threats emerge.
What is D2C and why should I care?

Traditional cellular networks rely on dense, ground-based infrastructure: ugly cell towers, fibre optic cables and data centers. D2C turns this model on its head. Satellites function like flying cell towers, using standard radio bands to connect directly with everyday smartphones, no satellite phone and no spoiled views (sorry astronomers!).

The benefits are clear: universal coverage, faster disaster response and access for underserved regions. But with the race to deployment ongoing, complex cybersecurity threats stretching from the screen to the sky may be overlooked by engineers who are simply moving too fast to see them.
The expanding attack surface

D2C systems face distinct and unique threats. Attackers don’t need physical proximity to interfere and broadcasts from orbit can be jammed or spoofed by anybody with modest technical gear. It’s not a question of if, it’s a question of when threat actors, like nation-states, test their luck on these systems.

The consequences of a D2C breach are profound. A targeted outage could disrupt emergency services, cut students off from remote learning or cripple business operations in remote regions. In developing countries, D2C satellites may become a primary method of internet access for millions of people — making any cyber event not just a technical hiccup but a social, economic and even public health crisis.
Key vulnerabilities to watch

1. Signal jamming & spoofing: Jamming floods a satellite’s receivers with gobbledygook, cutting off legitimate users. Spoofing mimics real signals to hijack data or trick devices into unsafe connections.

2. Telemetry, tracking & control (TT&C) exploits: TT&C systems manage the satellite’s vital functions. If breached, an attacker could redirect, disable or even take control of a satellite.

3. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks: Intercepting data between the user and ground station. It’s complex but possible, especially if encryption or routing is weak.

4. Physical threats: Cybersecurity doesn’t stop at software. Anti-satellite weapons, space debris, or directed energy attacks like space lasers could knock satellites offline or damage components.

5. Ground station weaknesses: These Earth-based links often run on cloud platforms, leaving them exposed to phishing, unpatched systems or misconfigurations.

6. Supply chain attacks: Satellites are built from parts sourced worldwide. A malicious chip or compromised firmware update could introduce vulnerabilities.

7. Human factors: Insider threats remain a wildcard. A careless administrator, a disgruntled engineer or a poorly secured login could unravel the best technical defences.
Recommendations

Securing these constellations requires a security by design approach, built from the ground up to provide protections against all threats — even the ones that haven’t been discovered yet. As these systems are global by design, an international framework should be created. This approach requires layered, coordinated and future proof action. Drawing from the principles of defence-in-depth, practical use cases and the broader threat landscape, the following proposals outline how regulatory bodies and commercial companies can work together to build resilient and secure systems.

1. Creation of an International Framework: As satellite constellations expand, securing them requires more than isolated national efforts. A unified, multi-stakeholder framework is essential, one that includes space agencies, defense bodies such as the U.S. Space Force, commercial operators like Starlink or AST SpaceMobile and regulators.

A start could be a cybersecurity council facilitated by the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). This body could share threat intelligence and outline global standards. Modelled on organizations like the International Civil Aviation Organization, the council would align national and commercial actors around shared protocols, using frameworks like NIST and ISO/IEC 27001 to ensure accountability and reduce fragmentation.

2. Defense-in-depth architectures: A defense-in-depth model that uses multiple layers of security controls to protect data and information should be foundational in all space system architectures. In practice, this means that engineers developing these systems should install additional layers of security to delay, detect and deny attacks.

Key elements include:

AI-driven anomaly detection at both satellite and ground levels.
Moving target defenses that rotate system configurations to reduce predictability.
Segmenting networks to isolate damage and contain lateral movement during an incident.
Redundant ground stations for use in case of compromise to minimize downtime.

3. Modernize cryptographic approaches: According to Edward Smith of the Defense Department’s Cybersecurity & Information Systems Information Analysis Center (CSIAC), “Encryption enhances security in space networks, carefully considering its impact on performance and developing advanced encryption methods are essential to mitigate potential vulnerabilities.”

Operators should prioritize upgrading existing systems with post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, implement strong key management practices and adopt zero-trust architectures to mitigate present-day risks while preparing for the eventual rise of quantum attackers.

In time, the industry can move beyond traditional public key infrastructure models that assume robust hardware and terrestrial conditions. For cubesats and small-scale systems, lightweight encryption schemes and chaos-based algorithms that offer better performance with lower power and processing demands.

4. Harden ground stations and TT&C links: Ground infrastructure remains one of the most targeted points in space communication networks. The 2022 KA-SAT incident, where Russia-linked hackers disabled satellite modems is a prime example. The operator is responsible for ensuring that ground stations and TT&C links are adequately secure, employing techniques like:

Deploying digital beamforming with phased array antennas to reduce signal interception.
Implementing end-to-end encryption for TT&C traffic.
Continuously monitoring command traffic for unauthorized or anomalous patterns.
Implementing secure physical security surrounding all ground stations including staff trained on social engineering detection techniques and multi-factor authentication.

These measures should be validated through red-teaming exercises and simulated disruptions.

5. Mission readiness and workforce training: Cybersecurity should not be treated as a back-office IT concern. It must be embedded into launch planning, mission operations and workforce development. While regulators should establish a realistic baseline minimum for cybersecurity posture across their respective space sectors, organizations should not wait for mandates to act. A proactive approach is essential to ensuring the maximum level of readiness.

All mission operators and contractors should be trained to a common cybersecurity standard, such as NIST’s NICE framework or ISO/IEC 27001’s audit guidelines. Tabletop exercises and simulation-based training like mimicking a spoofed control command or a ground station DDoS should be recurring elements of preparedness protocols.

6. Conduct annual audits and adopt industry-specific metrics: Regular internal and external cybersecurity audits are essential for resilience. These should be commissioned by the operator to test their posture and go beyond compliance checklists to include penetration testing, zero-day scenario analysis and evaluation of incident response effectiveness. Metrics that can be audited include:

Employee resistance to social engineering or phishing attempts.
Mean time to detect satellite anomalies.
Mean time to respond to known threats.
Intrusion attempt frequency per mission.

7. Align incentives for operators: To drive broader compliance, regulatory bodies and insurers could align financial and operational incentives with strong cybersecurity performance. Satellite operators that demonstrate adherence to cybersecurity baselines in areas like zero-trust architecture and end-to-end encryption could receive reduced insurance premiums and faster regulatory clearance for launches. This approach would reward proactive behavior while discouraging corner-cutting on security, in addition to the penalties already in place in most countries with regards to data breaches.

8. Invest in threat research: All involved parties with means should invest in R&D areas that future-proof systems, Secure software defined networking for flexible satellite-ground links and formal verification methods for satellite firmware and chip components. Completing this work collaboratively across academic labs, defense research agencies and private innovation centers can avoid redundant or siloed knowledge.

9. Create a shared incident database for the space sector: Space operators should contribute anonymized data on cyber incidents to a shared threat intelligence platform modelled after aviation’s ASRS. Such a database would support:

Early warning systems for new vulnerabilities.
Trends analysis across vendors and missions.
Identification of systemic failures before they become endemic.

Managing this platform under a neutral party like UNOOSA or the Space ISAC would ensure buy-in and minimize reputational risks that might otherwise discourage disclosure.

D2C satellite communication is likely going to redefine how the world connects, and it’s coming sooner than you may think. But its success hinges on more than rocket science. It depends on engineers and security professionals ensuring they can build systems that are not just cutting edge, but resilient. Cybersecurity isn’t just a nice-to-have, it’s mission-critical. Failure to properly implement security measures may result in more than individual mission failures, it could destroy public trust in critical infrastructure, create extensive monetary ramifications and cause ripples across global networks dependent on satellite data.

Jamie Munro holds a First-Class BSc Honours degree in Cyber Security and Networks from Glasgow Caledonian University and is currently an IT Engineer working in the UK Public Sector.

U.S. satellite firms look abroad as foreign nations seek ‘sovereign’ eyes in the sky , American satellite imaging companies are witnessing a boom in demand from unexpected customers: those based abroad.

Earth observation satellite operators such as Maxar Intelligence, BlackSky, Planet Labs and Capella Space are increasingly looking beyond traditional United States government customers and instead aiming to serve foreign nations who want their own surveillance capabilities. These companies, while still tethered closely to U.S. government contracts, are recasting themselves as global vendors of what they call “sovereign” space capabilities. As a result, they are striking high-value international deals that promise long-term revenue and access to new markets.

The move reflects the democratization of space-based Earth observation technology. It’s also a sign of broader geopolitical realignments.

Countries that have historically relied on American intelligence sharing are now saying they need their own eyes in the sky, said Dave Gauthier, a former U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency official who is the chief strategy officer at the consulting firm GXO Inc.

More nations, he said, are taking advantage of the fact that the remote-sensing industry, once dominated by classified government programs and limited to major powers, has evolved into an innovative and competitive commercial marketplace.

This recalibration of business outside the U.S. comes as the Trump administration enacts spending cuts across federal agencies, including those that have been reliable customers for Earth observation satellite firms.

As Washington pares back spending, U.S. companies are forced to diversify their clientele. Simultaneously, international demand for independent, space-based surveillance is accelerating in response to regional tensions and a growing skepticism about relying too heavily on American intelligence streams.

Collectively, “this is good for business,” Gauthier said.

The appeal of commercial space-based remote sensing extends far beyond traditional military and intelligence applications. While defense and intelligence represent the most obvious and sought-after uses of Earth observation satellites, Gauthier said countries are recognizing these assets can support critical industries such as energy, agriculture and oil and gas. Satellites can help identify promising areas for exploration by mapping geological features, enable real-time monitoring of crop health and soil moisture and support monitoring and maintenance of energy infrastructure such as power plants.

“The demand is driven by the fact that so many sectors in a nation can benefit from access to geospatial intelligence,” Gauthier said. “There’s broad utility to having geoint capabilities at your disposal.”
Challenges and confidentiality

The international satellite intelligence services market operates within a complex regulatory and security environment. Many contracts, especially with defense or intelligence agencies, remain confidential or undisclosed due to national security considerations. This opacity makes it difficult to quantify the international market, though the disclosed contracts suggest the scale represents hundreds of millions of dollars in annual business for U.S. firms.

Export controls and technology transfer restrictions also influence how these American companies can serve international customers. Companies must navigate domestic regulatory requirements, executives pointed out, while meeting customer demands for genuine sovereign capabilities.

One turning point has been the conflict in Ukraine. The war has served as a powerful demonstration of commercial satellite imagery’s military utility, showing how civilian space assets can provide battlefield intelligence. It’s also accelerated international interest in commercial capabilities.

The commercial satellite industry, meanwhile, has undergone dramatic changes over the past decade. What once required billion-dollar government programs and decades of development can now be accomplished with relatively modest investments and commercially available technology. This democratization has opened opportunities for nations that previously lacked the resources or expertise to develop space-based intelligence capabilities.

Maxar Intelligence in February completed the deployment of its WorldView Legion six-satellite high-resolution imaging constellation, offering what it calls dedicated capacity packages. This setup allow foreign governments to direct satellite tasking without the burdens of building or maintaining the infrastructure.

“It’s like having a sovereign capability,” said Anders Linder, who leads Maxar’s international government business operations from London. “Customers can buy their own antenna, reserve time on Maxar’s satellites and direct where they want pictures taken. That’s a simpler and much more affordable option than building, deploying and operating a constellation.”

To reinforce its global posture, the company brought in advisers such as retired U.K. Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach and Tadashi Miyagawa, the former head of Japan’s defense intelligence agency. Maxar now maintains personnel in London, Singapore, Sweden, India and Japan — with plans to expand into the Middle East.

The company recently announced an agreement with Sweden’s largest defense contractor Saab to develop geospatial intelligence products. In December 2024, Maxar secured $35 million in tasking contracts with two unnamed Asia-Pacific governments, granting them direct access to WorldView Legion and to synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery from partner Umbra Space. And in January 2025, leaders announced a $14 million deal with the Netherlands Ministry of Defense for on-demand imagery to support intelligence, mapping and military operations.

Demand is also growing beyond traditional defense needs. In a recent deal with a southern Asian country, Maxar’s data was used for civilian property surveillance to verify land use and enforce tax compliance.

“Europe is now catching up to be at the same level as the Middle East and Asia Pacific,” Linder said of the global appetite.
Long-term deals

More nations, some with limited space capabilities, are signing on to intelligence-as-a-service models, Brian O’Toole, CEO of BlackSky, said during a earnings call earlier this year. In many cases, these deals are long-term, a critical factor for commercial satellite firms looking for predictable revenue to reassure investors and shareholders.

“We’re getting international agreements for five and seven years,” O’Toole said. This arrangement gives the company predictability as it invests in next-generation satellites, he added.

BlackSky officials said they recently landed a $100 million seven-year subscription contract with an undisclosed foreign government, along with nearly $20 million in multi-year agreements to support India’s commercial Earth observation efforts. The company, which specializes in real-time imagery and analytics, is working with Thales Alenia Space to build a high-resolution optical satellite for India’s Nibe Ltd. — a major defense contractor. This satellite will anchor what is expected to become a constellation supporting Indian national security needs.

The BlackSky-Thales Alenia partnership in India follows a similar $50 million agreement with the Republic of Indonesia. “International opportunities today are tremendous,” O’Toole said. “U.S. companies are helping our allies accelerate their capabilities.”

Planet Labs is following a similar path. The company runs a constellation of over 200 satellites offering daily global imaging, is also diversifying its business and pursuing international deals.

In January, Planet signed a $230 million, seven-year agreement with an unnamed Asia-Pacific customer to build high-resolution satellites and provide commercial imagery.

The German government, meanwhile, inked a seven-figure deal for Planet’s full suite of geospatial products, which it will use for environmental monitoring, land-use tracking and socioeconomic research.
The power of SAR

SAR satellites, which can capture images through clouds and at night, complement optical satellites that require clear weather and daylight.

Frank Backes, CEO of Capella Space, a SAR imaging company recently acquired by the quantum computing firm IonQ, said the international demand for commercial SAR is growing.

“Our pipeline and our opportunities have improved significantly in the last two months,” he said in an interview, noting that Japan has become the firm’s second-largest government customer behind the U.S.

The company is also in talks with the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates to provide SAR satellites they can operate independently . “Sovereign control can mean different things to different countries,” Backes said. “Priority access is what a lot of countries are looking for.”

REYKJAVÍK, Iceland — The White House is withdrawing the nomination of Jared Isaacman to be administrator of NASA, throwing an agency already reeling from proposed massive budget cuts into further disarray.

In a statement to SpaceNews May 31, White House spokesperson Liz Huston said that the administration is looking for a new person to lead the agency. The statement came after a report earlier in the day by Semafor that the White House would withdraw the nomination.

“The Administrator of NASA will help lead humanity into space and execute President Trump’s bold mission of planting the American flag on the planet Mars,” Huston stated. “It’s essential that the next leader of NASA is in complete alignment with President Trump’s America First agenda and a replacement will be announced directly by President Trump soon.”

The statement did not disclose why the White House was seeking a new nominee, and Huston did not immediately respond to questions about the decision. The statement did not disclose whether the decision to withdraw the nomination was made by the White House or by Isaacman, although other sources state the decision was by the administration.

President Trump said in a social media post late May 31 that he was withdrawing the nomination. “After a thorough review of prior associations, I am hereby withdrawing the nomination of Jared Isaacman to head NASA. I will soon announce a new Nominee who will be Mission aligned, and put America First in Space,” he stated.

In his own post a short time later, Isaacman thanked Trump, the Senate and “all those who supported me throughout this journey.” He did not directly address the White House’s decision, saying only that the six months since Trump announced his intent to nominate him “have been enlightening and, honestly, a bit thrilling.”

“The President, NASA and the American people deserve the very best–an Administrator ready to reorganize, rebuild and rally the best and brightest minds to deliver the world-changing headlines NASA was built to create,” Isaacman added.

The decision to pull Isaacman’s nomination comes as a shock to the space industry. Until this news, Isaacman appeared ready to be confirmed within days. Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R-S.D.) filed cloture on the nomination May 22, a procedural move that would have set up a vote to confirm Isaacman the week of June 3.

There was no public opposition to the nomination from Republicans, who hold the majority in the Senate, and several Democratic members of the Senate Commerce Committee voted with Republicans to favorably report the nomination to the full Senate April 30.

Isaacman also had strong support from industry, with many organizations lobbying the Senate to first hold a confirmation hearing and then to confirm him. Isaacman had the support of 28 former NASA astronauts who signed a letter in March endorsing him, as well as from former NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine, who said that he thought Isaacman would be an “amazing” administrator.

One senator expressed dismay at reports that the White House might withdraw Isaacman’s nomination. “Astronaut and successful businessman @RookIsaacman was a strong choice by President Trump to lead NASA. I was proud to introduce Jared at his hearing and strongly oppose efforts to derail his nomination,” Sen. Tim Sheehy (R-Mont.) posted on social media May 31.

It’s unclear what caused the White House to change course on the nomination. Some sources speculate that it was linked to an eroding relationship between President Trump and Elon Musk, the chief executive of SpaceX who has been a close adviser to the president. The decision came a day after Trump and Musk held a press conference to mark the end of Musk’s formal tenure as a special government employee supporting the Department of Government Efficiency, although the nomination was not mentioned during the public part of the briefing.

Isaacman was widely seen as Musk’s choice to lead the agency. Isaacman had been a customer of SpaceX, leading the Inspiration4 and Polaris Dawn private astronaut missions.

The New York Times reported May 31 that President Trump decided to withdraw the nomination after being informed that Isaacman had, in recent years, made donations to Democratic candidates and party offices. While that would explain Trump’s comments about “prior associations,” those donations were publicly known and widely reported since shortly after the nomination was announced.

It also comes a day after NASA released more details about its proposed fiscal year 2026 budget, which seeks to cut the agency’s overall spending by about 25%, with steeper cuts in science, space technology and other areas outside of exploration.

Isaacman, in written responses to questions from members of the Senate Commerce Committee in April, said he was not involved in budget deliberations but said reports that science funding could be cut by nearly 50% “does not appear to be an optimal outcome.” The budget documents released May 30, as well as a top-level “skinny” budget four weeks earlier, confirmed those cuts.

“I have not flown my last mission—whatever form that may ultimately take–but I remain incredibly optimistic that humanity’s greatest spacefaring days lie ahead,” Isaacman wrote in his post. “I’ll always be grateful for this opportunity and cheering on our President and NASA as they lead us on the greatest adventure in human history.”

GPS III SV-08, built by Lockheed Martin, is the eighth of 10 GPS III spacecraft acquired by the Pentagon under a 2008 contract. Compared to earlier models, GPS III satellites provide nearly eight times better anti-jamming resistance and deliver improved accuracy and reliability, according to the Space Force. They also transmit the encrypted M-code signal for U.S. military use and L5, a civilian safety-of-life signal intended for aviation and other transport applications.

The satellites operate in medium Earth orbit, roughly 12,550 miles above Earth — an altitude optimized for global coverage and consistent timing signals.

“Every launch makes the GPS constellation more accurate and resilient,” Col. Andrew Menschner, commander of Mission Delta 31, said in a statement after the launch. Mission Delta 31 operates the GPS constellation from Colorado Springs, Colorado,.

“With 31 active vehicles, seven on orbit in reserve status, and two GPS III vehicles completed and ready for launch, the constellation is healthy and ready to support the six billion people around the world who use our capabilities every day,” he said.

SV-08 is now being controlled from Lockheed Martin’s launch and checkout operations center in Denver until its official acceptance into the operational GPS network.

Originally assigned to United Launch Alliance (ULA), SV-08 was switched to SpaceX to expedite deployment. ULA’s next-generation Vulcan Centaur rocket, recently certified for national security missions, is not expected to begin flying such payloads until later this summer.

The switch underscores the shifting dynamics of the U.S. launch sector, where SpaceX dominates in both commercial and national security missions. Friday’s flight marked the fifth national security launch by the company this year, with another dozen on the manifest through December.

#FAA demands an accident investigation into SpaceX’s latest out-of-control Starship flight.

CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. — The Federal Aviation Administration is demanding an accident investigation into this week’s out-of-control Starship flight by SpaceX.

Tuesday’s test flight from Texas lasted longer than the previous two failed demos of the world’s biggest and most powerful rocket, which ended in flames over the Atlantic. The latest spacecraft made it halfway around the world to the Indian Ocean, but not before going into a spin and breaking apart.

The FAA said Friday that no injuries or public damage were reported.

The first-stage booster — recycled from an earlier flight — also burst apart while descending over the Gulf of Mexico. But that was the result of deliberately extreme testing approved by the FAA in advance.

All wreckage from both sections of the 403-foot (123-metre) rocket came down within the designated hazard zones, according to the FAA.

The FAA will oversee SpaceX’s investigation, which is required before another Starship can launch.

CEO Elon Musk said he wants to pick up the pace of Starship test flights, with the ultimate goal of launching them to Mars. NASA needs Starship as the means of landing astronauts on the moon in the next few years.

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The Associated Press Health and Science Department receives support from the Howard Hughes Medical Institute’s Science and Educational Media Group and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. The AP is solely responsible for all content.

Marcia Dunn, The Associated Press

Overcoming conservatism in the autonomous space revolution .

In the evolving landscape of space technology, a pivotal transformation is quietly taking shape: the development of spacecraft autonomy. While launch capabilities often dominate headlines, the real innovation frontier lies in what happens after they get there.

Think of autonomous spacecraft as the space equivalent of self-driving cars. For a decade, we’ve watched autonomous vehicles navigate our roads. Yet remarkably, despite the technology being available for years, fully autonomous spacecraft remain largely theoretical. This technological conservatism isn’t due to capability limitations — it’s driven by understandable risk aversion.

The hesitation is understandable. When missions cost hundreds of millions of dollars and failure means total loss, conservatism becomes the default. However, this cautious approach is increasingly unsustainable in the rapidly evolving space economy.
Why current operations don’t scale

Traditional spacecraft Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO) require continuous communication between ground control and the vehicle. In Low Earth Orbit, this communication is only possible during brief 10-minute windows every 90 minutes. The remaining 80 minutes? Complete blackout.

For complex maneuvers like RPO — delicately approaching other objects in space — this limitation creates enormous challenges. It’s like climbing Mount Everest and then performing the Nutcracker ballet at the top. Everything is moving at seven kilometers per second, and a single miscalculation can be catastrophic.

The industry’s current solution? Expensive satellite communication relays and 24/7 teams of engineers ready to respond instantly. This approach simply doesn’t scale for the constellation era, where we envision hundreds of satellites working in unison.
Learning from past failures

The industry’s risk aversion isn’t without precedent. NASA’s 2005 Demonstration for Autonomous Rendezvous Technologies mission failed to meet any of its objectives, reinforcing the sector’s conservative tendencies. Such high-profile setbacks have cast long shadows over autonomous spacecraft development.

Most current approaches involve incrementally testing small technological components rather than implementing comprehensive autonomy solutions. Companies typically manually guide spacecraft to predefined positions before testing limited autonomous capabilities in controlled environments — a slow, cautious path to full autonomy.

Creating truly autonomous spacecraft requires mastering several critical functions without constant human supervision. The system must handle path planning by autonomously calculating fuel-efficient orbital transfer routes, target identification by detecting and identifying objects from tens of kilometers away and visual navigation using onboard cameras and processing to understand a target’s position and movement. Additionally, it needs to perform proximity operations with safe maneuvers to approach and operate near other objects, along with error correction capabilities to make independent course adjustments when deviations occur.

Each of these challenges requires sophisticated algorithms that must function reliably in the harsh, unpredictable environment of space, where communication delays and outages are inevitable and testing opportunities are limited.
Breaking the cycle of conservatism

The space industry has reached an inflection point where operational demands are beginning to outpace traditional control methods. As satellite constellations grow larger and missions become more complex, autonomy shifts from luxury to necessity.

Breaking this cycle requires a dual approach: rigorous ground testing followed by incremental in-space validation. Advanced test facilities — where zero gravity motion and the harsh conditions of space can be replicated in controlled on-ground test environments – provide crucial stepping stones between simulation and actual deployment.

Achieving space autonomy requires everyone to play their part. The government can be a massive unlock for innovation, but as a nation, we must be willing to take risks, learn from our progress and share intelligence across borders. Part of the intelligence sharing further extends to our universities, which are already working on fundamental research challenges, particularly in artificial intelligence validation and verification. However, this research needs to come out of the labs and into the hands of established aerospace companies and emerging startups who can bring their systems integration expertise and flight heritage to drive nimble innovation in specific autonomy domains.

Buried in the hallways of universities, Australia’s emerging space sector is already contributing significantly to this transition, leveraging our world-class academic institutions, for example, the University of Sydney’s Australian Centre for Robotics and the University of Adelaide’s Australian Institute for Machine Learning. By focusing on autonomy solutions rather than replicating existing technologies, newer entrants to the space industry can establish leadership in areas where risk aversion has created innovation vacuums. Space development is not a zero-sum game – advancements in autonomous capabilities benefit the entire global industry, making collaboration the most effective path forward for Australia to secure its place among spacefaring nations.
The autonomous future

The benefits of autonomous spacecraft extend far beyond operational convenience. They will dramatically reduce costs by eliminating the need for constant monitoring, enable new mission profiles previously impossible due to communication constraints, and potentially increase reliability by removing the most common source of spacecraft failures: human error, often jokingly referred to as PEBCAK — “Problem Exists Between Chair And Keyboard.”

As space becomes increasingly commercialized, the economic imperatives for autonomy will only grow stronger. The companies and countries that master this technology first will establish the standards that others must follow.

The future of space operations is undoubtedly autonomous. The question is no longer if this transformation will occur, but who will lead it and how quickly they can overcome the industry’s inherent conservatism to bring these capabilities to market.

Justin du Plessis is Attitude and Orbit Control Systems Lead at Space Machines Company.

AMSTERDAM — SpaceX’s Starship suffered a loss of attitude control after reaching space on its latest test flight May 27, leading to an uncontrolled reentry and a third consecutive failure.

Starship lifted off from SpaceX’s test site at Starbase, Texas, at 7:36 p.m. Eastern. The liftoff was delayed in the final seconds of the countdown because of an issue with a quick-disconnect fitting in ground equipment that required resetting the countdown to the T-40 second mark for several minutes to fix it.

This mission, Flight 9, sought to avoid the engine problems on the previous two test flights in January and March that caused the loss of the Starship upper stage during its ascent. All eyes were on the performance of the Starship’s six Raptor engines during a burn lasting nearly six and a half minutes.

Unlike those earlier flights, the engines appeared to operate normally, shutting down as expected after placing the vehicle in its planned suborbital trajectory. Video from the vehicle immediately after engine shutdown, though, appeared to show the vehicle venting propellants and in a slow roll.

SpaceX confirmed about 30 minutes after liftoff that Starship suffered a problem. “We are in a little bit of a spin. We did spring a leak in some of the fuel tank systems inside of Starship,” Dan Huot, a host of the SpaceX webcast of the launch, said. “At this point, we’ve essentially lost our attitude control with Starship.”

That loss of attitude control ruled out a controlled reentry. SpaceX elected to “passivate” the vehicle, venting the remaining propellant, ahead of reentry. Intermittent video from the vehicle showed the vehicle begin that reentry a little more than 40 minutes after liftoff, including damage to a flap before telemetry from the vehicle was lost at nearly T+47 minutes. The reentry occurred over a portion of the Indian Ocean where airspace and maritime notices were in place.

“Leaks caused loss of main tank pressure during the coast and re-entry phase. Lot of good data to review,” Elon Musk, chief executive of SpaceX, posted on social media after the loss of the vehicle. “Launch cadence for next 3 flights will be faster, at approximately 1 every 3 to 4 weeks.”

The plan for this mission included opening Starship’s payload bay door and releasing eight simulated next-generation Starlink satellites, which would also go on suborbital trajectories and reenter separately from Starship. However, the payload door failed to fully open and the release of the simulated satellites was canceled. It was not immediately clear if the failure of the door to open was associated to the propellant leak and loss of attitude control.

SpaceX also called off plans to relight a Raptor engine while in space. The uncontrolled reentry meant that SpaceX was unable to test alternative heat shield tiles or stress-test vulnerable areas on the vehicle, as planned.

SpaceX also fell short on some test objectives for the Super Heavy booster. The flight was the first to use a previously flown booster, in this case Booster 14, which launched Flight 7. SpaceX said before the launch it would not attempt a return of the booster to the launch site, carrying out tests intended to refine the flight profile of the vehicle and save propellant.

Those tests appeared to initially go as expected, but the vehicle was destroyed when it ignited its engines for a final landing burn.

Flight 9 is the third Starship test flight in a row that failed to make a controlled reentry and splashdown in the Indian Ocean. The previous two failures involved unrelated, separate issues with the Starship upper stage’s propulsion system. The failure raises new questions about SpaceX’s development of Starship and its ability to carry out key missions, including the Artemis 3 lunar landing currently scheduled for the middle of 2027.

Jared Isaacman, whose nomination to be NASA administrator its set to be confirmed by the Senate as soon as next week, expressed his appreciation for SpaceX continuing to show video from Starship as it began its uncontrolled reentry. “Appreciate the transparency–and bringing us space enthusiasts along through the highs and lows of a test program,” he said in a social media post moments after the loss of the vehicle.

“Some may focus on the lows,” he wrote, but argued that Starship and other launch vehicles in development are creating a “massive space economy” that will open up space. “When these capabilities arrive, they will spearhead a new era of exploration and discovery–and the lows will become a chapter in a much longer story.”